Work with US, with or without Trump

India- US relations have reached such a low that even the architects of the relationship are at the end of their tether and have reached the conclusion that it is time to call the bluff of the bully and find other alternatives to our foreign policy orientation. They say India-US relations are important, but not important enough to justify the price we have to pay.

An exhortation to call a spade a spade and speak truth to US power is like threatening to divorce someone whom you never married. India-US relations, which have been a roller coaster ride over the years, were never equal or reciprocal. It was a marriage of convenience to both, and there was never any expectation that a few occasional swallows were the harbingers of summer.

It all began with India’s nonalignment, which the US saw as inimical to its interests, and the US chose to embrace Pakistan, which joined a Western alliance but declared itself nonaligned. The US gave no value to Indian democracy and accepted the expectation of the UK that India would collapse in a few years. But India did everything it could to build a relationship based on the similarities between the two constitutions. After the Chinese aggression against India in 1962, the Kennedy administration viewed the Chinese invasion as a severe threat to South Asian stability and supported Delhi not only in words, but also with a massive supply of arms in response to India’s request. A US Navy aircraft headed towards the Bay of Bengal to signal deterrence. Although the US faced a nuclear crisis at the same time with Russia because of the Cuban missile crisis, the US was ready to stand with India against China. But a sudden withdrawal of the Chinese troops ended the possibility of joint action by the US and India against China.

India and the US began a period of uncertainty because of the US arms supplies to Pakistan, but India’s protests were heard in Washington, and the US began balancing India and Pakistan through a policy of hyphenation. India’s relations with the Soviet Union grew and became a point of concern, reaching a crescendo with the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which was seen as an abandonment of nonalignment. But Morarji Desai’s “genuine” nonalignment and seeming flexibility on NPT kept the roller coaster steady. In other words, we remained estranged democracies, but with cooperation in several areas, including defence and anti-terrorism.

During my tenure in Washington as Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission from 1997 to 2000, I saw some of the best and worst days in India-US relations, but there was no rupture, and a strategic relationship developed. Prime Minister Inder Gujral, who was my Ambassador in Moscow, ordered my posting to Washington even though the Ministry pointed out that it would be my third posting to the US, which was unusual. President Clinton had planned to visit India, and my brief was to prepare for the visit. But the government in India changed, and the announcement of a review of India’s nuclear policy sounded ominous. President Clinton asked every visiting dignitary from India what the review meant and even sent a Special Envoy to ask Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee himself. The answer was a Buddha-style smile, and the Envoy reported back that such a charming man like PM Vajpayee would not test nuclear weapons. But on May 11, 1998, the news came that India had tested several nuclear weapons and declared itself a nuclear weapon state. Clinton was even more furious because neither the CIA nor the State Department knew about the impending tests. ”I shall come down on these guys like a ton of bricks,” he said and did exactly that by imposing the severest sanctions ever imposed under the Glen Amendment. But the two countries did not say that it was time to call the bluff and abandon each other. EAM Jaswant Singh and Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbot worked hard for two years to enable Clinton to visit India and Vajpayee to visit Washington in 2000, opening a new chapter which led to the historic India-US civil nuclear agreement in 2008. In between, Clinton had summoned Nawaz Sharif to Washington on July 4, 1999, to ask him to withdraw from the Kargil posts Pakistan had occupied. This was the first time that the US supported India on the status of the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir.

The advent of Donald Trump in his first term looked like a bonanza for India, and the bromance between PM Modi and him made significant changes in India -US relations. His second coming after President Biden was like a breath of fresh air, but his unconventional behaviour affected even his closest allies. His unpredictability baffled everyone as he went around changing the world by himself, and India was not the only country affected in various ways. His affair with the Pakistani Field Marshal and elevating him to a mediator between him and Iran was disturbing for us, and he gave up the hyphenation between India and Pakistan and used Pakistan to get closer to China. These were his priorities and were not intended to harm India. We were caught in the crossfire between him and Russia and his war with Iran.

We have become entangled in his legislation on matters like Russian oil, immigration, and visas, but he will likely soon discover that he cannot do without Indians, and he may change his mind about Indian immigration. He may want to strengthen the Quad beyond his allies, and do so with the only country in the Quad that shares a border with China, to stop any Chinese onslaught. We have managed India-US relations over the years, and we have options other than threatening to speak to power. A senior Indian diplomat reacted to the proposal by calling the bully's bluff. “Ok, we will do as suggested, but then what next?”

In diplomacy, there are many options between cordiality and war. I had suggested, when President Trump endorsed the view that India was a “hell hole”, that we should recall our Ambassador for consultations, indicating a review of our relations with the United States. But there were many voices against such a “drastic” action, particularly because of the Indian diaspora and the prospects for trade and other advantages. But what is being suggested now is a declaration of hostility to the US as a policy. Not as a tactic. For good or for evil, the US will remain on the globe as a powerful nation, and we have to practice the art of diplomacy to do business with it without being servile to it, with or without Trump.