Poor maintenance, defective equipment, crew's misconduct behind sinking of MSC ELSA 3, says report

Kochi: A preliminary investigation into the sinking of container vessel MSC ELSA 3 off the Kerala coast has revealed a series of systemic failures by the ship's management and shore-based support systems, with investigators concluding that poor maintenance, defective equipment, inadequate crew training and weak safety oversight contributed to the disaster.

The findings are detailed in an interim report submitted to the Kerala High Court by the Centre on behalf of the Directorate General of Shipping while opposing a plea by crew members to return to their home countries. The preliminary investigation under Section 359 (1) of the MS Act, 1958, has identified instances of negligence, operational error or incompetency, miscommunication and misconduct among crew members.

The High Court on Tuesday allowed three crew members of the vessel, including the electro-technical engineer, a seaman and a motorman, to return home. The Liberian-flagged MSC ELSA 3, built in 1997, sank on May 25, 2025, about 38 nautical miles off the Kerala coast between Vizhinjam and Kochi. The vessel was carrying 643 containers, including 13 containing hazardous materials, raising environmental concerns along the coasts of Kerala and Tamil Nadu.

What happened?
According to the report, the vessel first ran into trouble on May 24, 2025, when a failure in the ballast system caused it to begin listing. Within 12 hours, the list increased to 27 degrees, causing several containers on deck to fall overboard or be jettisoned. Although the list was temporarily reduced to 22 degrees on the starboard side and appeared stable for a few hours, the situation soon worsened. "The list started increasing progressively," the report said.

Investigators found that the malfunction eventually triggered a complete blackout after the vessel's internal power generation systems failed. "Without power or the ability to correct the listing condition, the situation deteriorated over approximately 24 hours until the vessel ultimately sank," the report noted adding that critical failures in the ballast water and heeling correction systems resulted in an uncontrollable 26-degree list to starboard.

The vessel's heeling tank mechanism was reportedly non-functional and not operating in automatic mode. As a result, crew members routinely corrected the ship's list manually after cargo operations, causing delays and drawing complaints from ports, including Vizhinjam.

Investigators found that the ageing vessel lacked the redundancy and monitoring systems found on newer ships. Maintenance of ballast-handling equipment was found to be inadequate, while several longstanding technical defects remained unresolved.

The report noted that classification society Bureau Veritas had previously issued a "condition of class" warning over defects in the vessel's cargo hold bilge pumping system and bilge sensors. Several critical spare parts requested by the crew had not been supplied even eight months after requisitions were raised. "These requests had been flagged as 'critical' but remained unfulfilled at the time of the sinking," the report said. Defective ballast system components identified during earlier inspections were also not replaced, with temporary repairs continuing well beyond their intended lifespan.

The investigation identified multiple failures in the vessel's Safety Management System (SMS), including inadequate maintenance procedures, delayed supply of spare parts, defective machinery and insufficient crew training.

Crew members reportedly lacked practical training in handling emergency ballast operations and prolonged blackout situations. While they possessed theoretical knowledge, investigators found that many were unfamiliar with manual override procedures that became crucial during the emergency.

The report also highlighted evidence of compromised watertight integrity. Water entered the vessel through a leaking manhole cover on Double Bottom Tank No 5 and a crack in the weld seam of No 5 Port Wing Ballast Tank, eventually reaching Cargo Hold No 4.

Investigators concluded that latent structural weaknesses and progressive flooding eventually led to catastrophic hull failure. "These structural issues indicate that the vessel was not seaworthy at the time of departure from Vizhinjam Port," the report said.

The report was equally critical of MSC's shore-based technical management team operating from Limassol, Cyprus.

Investigators found that abnormal pressure readings in the ballast management system had been recorded for 36 hours before the vessel developed a severe list. However, neither automated monitoring systems nor shore personnel flagged the warning signs.

When the vessel first reported stability issues, the shore-based technical team allegedly took more than three hours to assemble specialists and establish effective communication.

The report described the delay as critical, noting that timely intervention could have prevented the disaster. Investigators further found that shore support personnel lacked adequate understanding of the vessel's ballast systems and emergency response procedures. Communication between the vessel and shore teams was described as intermittent and ineffective during the final 12 hours before the sinking.

The company was also criticised for failing to address long-pending defects involving the heeling system, unmanned machinery control systems, cargo hold bilge systems and auxiliary engine alarm systems.