The Court noted that "granting the relief of anticipatory bail to an absconding accused person sets a bad precedent''.

The Court noted that "granting the relief of anticipatory bail to an absconding accused person sets a bad precedent''.

The Court noted that "granting the relief of anticipatory bail to an absconding accused person sets a bad precedent''.

New Delhi: The Supreme Court has ruled that an absconding accused cannot invoke the principle of parity to seek anticipatory bail merely because a co-accused has been acquitted after trial.

The Court noted that "granting the relief of anticipatory bail to an absconding accused person sets a bad precedent and sends a message that the law-abiding co-accused persons who stood trial, were wrong to diligently attend the process of trial and further, incentivises people to evade the process of law with impunity."

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A Bench comprising Justices JB Pardiwala and Vijay Bishnoi heard the matter after the complainant challenged an order of the Indore Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, which had granted anticipatory bail to Respondent No.2, who had been declared an absconder, only because the co-accused in the FIR had been acquitted.

The complainant argued before the Supreme Court that parity cannot be claimed by someone who has evaded trial and that the acquittal of co-accused was based on evidence specific to them. He further contended that such acquittal did not amount to a change in circumstances, particularly since the accused’s earlier bail applications had already been rejected.

The State also supported the complainant’s appeal, and the Supreme Court questioned why it had not challenged the High Court’s order earlier.

Accepting the appellant’s arguments, Justice Bishnoi, who authored the judgment, observed:

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“…the ground raised by the (Absconder) Accused that other co-accused in the Subject FIR have been acquitted by the trial Court…does not ipso facto entitle him to the relief of anticipatory bail on the ground of parity, particularly when the Accused himself failed to cooperate with the Court and delayed the trial of the other co-accused by absconding.”

The Court found that the High Court had granted anticipatory bail solely on the absence of strong evidence and the acquittal of co-accused. This approach was termed incorrect, especially since the accused had been absconding for nearly six years and could not rely on findings from a trial in which he did not participate.

The Supreme Court further observed:
“the High Court, by way of the Impugned Order, granted anticipatory bail to the Accused solely based on the fact that the prosecution failed to produce any cogent evidence… However, the said consideration is completely erroneous and perverse in an anticipatory bail application… In view of such circumstances, the Accused cannot be permitted to encash on the acquittal of the co-accused persons…,”

The Court added that any findings in the trial of co-accused are irrelevant for deciding the bail plea of an absconding accused, as the prosecution was not required to lead evidence against him during that trial.

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Absconder may get bail only in exceptional circumstances
The Supreme Court clarified that while absconders are generally not entitled to anticipatory bail, exceptions may exist in rare cases.

It observed:
“an absconder is not entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail as a general rule, however, in certain exceptional cases… where… no case is made out… the power of granting anticipatory bail may be exercised…”

Applying this principle, the Court held that the High Court had failed to exercise its discretion properly, as the present case did not warrant such relief.

It further noted:
“The Accused was a member of the mob… has not only absconded… but has also threatened to kill the injured victim… and this fact can also be corroborated by the registration of FIR No.272/2019…”

In view of these circumstances, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and directed the accused to surrender before the concerned court within four weeks from the date of the judgment, that is, by February 13, 2026.