Running KSRTC is not enough. It needs restructuring
KSRTC buses are too often involved in fatal road accidents. The reasons range from a shortage of engineers and poor maintenance to an ageing fleet. The urgent question is how the corporation can be made safer before it becomes an even bigger hazard.
KSRTC buses are too often involved in fatal road accidents. The reasons range from a shortage of engineers and poor maintenance to an ageing fleet. The urgent question is how the corporation can be made safer before it becomes an even bigger hazard.
KSRTC buses are too often involved in fatal road accidents. The reasons range from a shortage of engineers and poor maintenance to an ageing fleet. The urgent question is how the corporation can be made safer before it becomes an even bigger hazard.
It is deeply unfortunate that so many lives are being lost in road accidents involving KSRTC buses. These incidents stem from a combination of factors, ranging from administrative lapses to corruption in local procurements. Compared with organisations such as KSEB and the Kerala Water Authority, professionalism within KSRTC is severely lacking. While KSEB employs around 4,500 engineers and professionals, KSRTC has just 137. Even the Kerala Water Authority, with 6,500 employees, has 600 engineers.
Effective oversight within KSRTC has become nearly impossible under the existing system. In many other states, operations and maintenance of State road transport services function together under the supervision of engineers. In Kerala, the situation is the opposite. Conductors with only pre-degree qualifications occupy posts such as ADTO and DTO and act as administrative superiors to engineers. To prevent an ongoing turf conflict, both operations and maintenance must be brought under the control of engineers.
Although new electric buses have been introduced, KSRTC does not have an adequate number of electrical engineers. Even diesel buses today depend heavily on complex electrical and electronic systems. In the absence of trained specialists, many new buses are frequently left stranded on roads. There is also no systematic effort to send staff for company-level training.
Maintenance failures are equally alarming. Incidents such as coolant being poured into engines instead of engine oil, or tyres coming off while buses are in motion, point to grave negligence. Even basic pre-departure inspections by drivers are often not carried out before buses are taken on the road.
The most critical factor behind recurring accidents involving KSRTC buses is the failure to ensure proper maintenance of front axles. In Tamil Nadu, bus front axles are overhauled every six months as a routine practice. In Kerala, the first overhaul is carried out only after 50,000 kilometres, and thereafter at intervals of one lakh kilometres. This is particularly dangerous given that buses here operate on far more damaged roads.
Another unsafe practice relates to tyre replacement. When a new tyre is fitted, it is usually placed on the front wheel, which reduces driver control. In Tamil Nadu, a new tyre is first used on the rear wheels for three months before being moved to the front.
Blind spots around buses pose another major hazard, as nearby vehicles and pedestrians may go unnoticed. To address this, buses must be equipped with 360-degree cameras and dashboard cameras. Excessive workload on drivers also contributes significantly to accidents. Attempts to introduce a crew-change system and single-duty schedules have failed to take root. Even now, drivers are sometimes forced to drive continuously for 16 to 18 hours.
Drivers must be given mandatory rest after eight hours of duty. For this to be effective, proper rest facilities must be ensured for both drivers and conductors.
Substance abuse among drivers must also be addressed strictly. Accident rates would fall sharply if drivers responsible for mishaps faced firm action, such as suspension of licences for three years and salary cuts. However, the present system makes disciplinary action difficult. Court verdicts have effectively shielded erring drivers, and the government must enact suitable legislation to overcome these legal hurdles. This legal protection, combined with the influence of trade unions, allows drivers to return to duty even the day after causing fatal accidents.
The corporation needs only district-level workshops and three major zonal workshops to handle core maintenance and repairs. Vehicles of different manufacturers should ideally be serviced in specialised workshops. Instead, every depot attempts to handle all kinds of work, often inefficiently. Many tasks would be performed better if outsourced. Delays in the supply of spare parts force the corporation to rely on local purchases, where quality is often poor. This also opens the door to corruption. In some cases, parts are removed from buses lying idle and fitted into running vehicles. When new spares eventually arrive to repair grounded buses, even their older parts are often found missing.
While buses in Tamil Nadu run up to five lakh kilometres after engine reconditioning, those in Kerala manage only about two to three and a half lakh kilometres. Although manufacturers claim Volvo engines can operate for up to 25 lakh kilometres, in Kerala they barely last even half that distance.
An ageing fleet also plays a major role in road accidents. KSRTC cannot move forward without phasing out old vehicles. If immediate replacement is not feasible, hiring private buses could be a practical alternative. When responsibilities such as insurance, maintenance and staffing are borne by private operators, the financial and operational burden on the corporation can be significantly reduced.
Without comprehensive restructuring, reducing accidents involving KSRTC buses will remain an uphill task.
(The author is a former CMD of KSRTC and former State Transport Secretary.)