When India declined a Soviet offer of a space flight

As we celebrate the successful flight of Group Captain Shubhanshu Shukla to the International Space Station and back, I cannot but recall how India declined the offer of the Soviet Union to fly an Indian to space back in 1979. If that had not happened, Wing Commander Rakesh Sharma or another Indian would have travelled on board a Soviet spacecraft at least four years earlier.

This happened on the last day of Morarji Desai’s first and last visit to Moscow as Prime Minister. Desai, as the inventor of “genuine” nonalignment, visited Moscow merely to balance his visit to the United States. Apart from External Affairs Minister AB Vajpayee. Foreign Secretary Jagat Mehta, Joint Secretary Aravind Deo and I, as the Special Assistant to the Foreign Secretary, were on the delegation. The visit became complicated because Desai insisted that any joint statement between the two countries should not reference the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (1971), signed between India and the USSR, as it had violated the principle of non-alignment. This was made clear by the PM himself to the three of us, who negotiated the joint statement.

When the Soviet diplomats saw that our draft made no reference to the Treaty, they were quite shocked and told us plainly that there would be no joint statement if the Treaty was not reiterated in it. We thought that the opening positions of the two delegations could be resolved in the next two days of negotiations.

But when we reported the situation to the Prime Minister the next morning, while he was spinning some yarn on his charkha, we realised that the PM had an unshakeable stance on the Treaty, and we would have an uphill task in finding a compromise.

The Soviets were equally adamant on this matter and it became clear that they would not accept anything less than an endorsement of the Treaty as they considered the Treaty to be fundamental to the good relations between the two countries. Then we worked on the rest of the draft and decided to leave the Treaty to the Principals. Even on the third day of the visit, there was no agreement on this and the PM plainly told us that there was no need to have a joint statement. External Affairs Minister Vajpayee tried his best to tell the PM that the visit would be a disaster if there was no joint statement. It looked as though the PM felt that no statement was better than one with the Treaty in it.

Then came the time for a formal lunch with the two delegations. Just before the feast started, a senior Soviet official called me aside and said that the PM should be informed that President Brezhnev will be offering to fly an Indian on a Soviet spacecraft as a sign of the close relations between the Soviet Union and India. I quickly informed the Foreign Secretary and the Minister about the offer to be made at lunch, and both of them said it was a great idea, particularly if the joint statement had to be abandoned. But no one bothered to warn the PM about the offer as it was taken for granted that the PM would be delighted to accept the offer.

Towards the end of the lunch, which was a little tense on account of the Treaty issue, Brezhnev said that he had an important announcement to make and said with a flourish that he was happy to invite an Indian to space in a Soviet rocket. He said this was a gesture of friendship as it was done in the case of friends like Warsaw Pact countries and Vietnam. Everyone smiled and the atmosphere became cheerful.

All the eyes were on Desai, who appeared to consider the matter deeply. Then, without even consulting Minister Vajpayee sitting next to him, he said, “It does not seem to be a good idea.” When his words were interpreted, the unlit cigarette fell off Brezhnev’s lips, and he turned to Prime Minister Kosygin and asked him what Desai said. Kosygin explained to him that Desai had declined the offer. Both delegations were equally surprised at this development, and Vajpayee sent a note to Desai, urging him to accept the offer. Meanwhile, Kosygin asked Desai what the problem was.

Desai’s explanation surprised everyone even more. He said that an Indian being launched into space on a Soviet spaceship as a “passenger” would not provide significant learning or technological advancement for India. He added that the individual would not gain substantial knowledge by simply being flown to space. He will be like the dog, Laika, which travelled to space! He also pointed out the difficulty in selecting and training the right person for such a flight and the resources that would be wasted in training multiple individuals, only one of whom would fly.

The Soviets did not press the point, as they perceived the Indians saw offer as more of a symbolic gesture than a substantial contribution to India’s independent space programme. The lunch ended abruptly, leaving everyone completely confused.

When the time for the formal banquet came, Desai and Brezhnev, who were sitting next to each other, discussed the question of a reference to the Treaty in the joint statement and agreed on a compromise proposal to the effect that bilateral relations would proceed in the “Spirit of the Treaty”.

It was only after the return of Indira Gandhi's government in 1980 that the proposal was revived, and Rakesh Sharma flew in a Soyuz rocket to space and returned to a hero’s welcome. Desai’s anxiety to follow the “genuine” nonaligned approach caused a setback to Indo-Soviet cooperation in space by four years.