How drones changed the game in India–Pakistan conflict—and exposed gaps in electronic warfare

While ground attack aircraft like MiGs, Mirages and Jaguars dominated the 1999 Kargil War, it was a smaller, more potent machine that defined the recent India–Pakistan conflict in the aftermath of the Pahalgam terror attack: drones.

These unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) emerged as the decisive factor in Operation Sindoor, exposing both the strengths and vulnerabilities of India’s drone warfare capabilities. Following the recent conflict, India is already planning to invest heavily in local industry and could spend as much as $470 million on UAVs over the next 12 to 24 months, roughly three times pre-conflict levels, Smit Shah of Drone Federation India, which represents over 550 companies, told Reuters recently.

Speaking to Onmanorama’s News Brake podcast, retired Major General Indrabalan, a veteran of the Kargil War,  says that while India responded effectively to Pakistan’s drone warfare during Operation Sindoor, the country must avoid overstating its success. “We did a tremendously good job, but we’re far from being on top of drone warfare,” he said.

A paradigm shift in warfare
In today’s electronic battlefield, drones are not just surveillance tools but critical offensive assets. Ukraine’s use of Bayraktar TB2s, Raven, Phoenix Ghost and FPV drones to dismantle Russian supply lines during the Russia–Ukraine war marked a turning point.

“That was the first time we saw drones being deployed on a large scale—and not just deployed, but used effectively. Ukraine halted many of Russia’s offensives by devastating logistics columns and striking with accuracy,” Indrabalan said. Pakistan, he added, was quick to adapt to these tactics.

After Indian launched Operation Sindoor on Pakistan’s ‘terrorist infrastructure’ on May 7, Pakistan sent hundreds of drones along the border with India, with between 300 and 400 of them pushing in along 36 locations to probe Indian air defences.

The country deployed at least three categories of drones: Long-range attack drones equipped with heavy warheads, ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) drones to monitor Indian troop movements, and tactical drones, including loitering munitions and grenade-dropping UAVs, for battlefield disruption. Among these were Turkish Bayraktar UAVs, Chinese CH-4s, Turkey’s Songar drones, and low-cost FPV models assembled from commercial Chinese parts.

India responded with a layered defence that included S-400 missile systems, L/70 anti-aircraft guns, radar-linked targeting units, and even manual drone neutralisation by ground troops. “The innovation by our soldiers deserves applause,” said Indrabalan. “But that’s not a long-term fix.”

“We need drones that are hardened—physically and electronically—for military use. By physical hardening, I mean structural materials. But more importantly, the electronic systems—the drone’s brain, its communication, its navigation—need to be resilient and secure,” he said.

Four key challenges
Despite field-level ingenuity, India’s ability to wield drone power is hampered by four interconnected issues:

Technology gap: Most Indian drone manufacturers focus on civilian applications. Indigenous military-grade drones with hardened electronics remain scarce. Drones, once seen as support systems, have now become frontline tools.

Lack of training: Troops have not been trained to treat drones as frontline weapons, resulting in suboptimal deployment.

Electronic warfare vulnerability: Many Indian drones operate on open citizen-band frequencies, making them easy targets for jamming, spoofing and cyberattacks. The military has flagged these vulnerabilities to the drone industry, and India now needs to develop drones that can resist such tactics.

“Pakistan also used a swarm of drones as decoys. When it’s difficult to distinguish between drones carrying weapons and decoys, we end up using ammunition. We need a system to differentiate them,” Indrabalan said.

Identification of friend and foe (IFF) was another major challenge. “When the drone is still on the Pakistani side, we generally know it’s theirs. But in this conflict, drones often got mixed—ours crossed into their side, theirs into ours. Some were ISR drones just floating near the LoC,” he noted.

“The real challenge came when both sides had ISR drones operating close to the LoC. A Pakistani ISR drone might be hovering right over the line, and we’d have one there too. How do you tell them apart? That was a major problem. Our IFF capability was lacking. Possibly, both sides faced this issue,” he added.

The objectives in IFF are threefold: avoid fratricide—don’t shoot your own drones, accurately neutralise enemy drones and create deceptive signatures to confuse the adversary.

Dependency on imports: Indian combat drones are often assembled from knock-down kits using foreign components. Critical systems—including hardware, operating software, communications and navigation—are not yet fully indigenised.

Indrabalan also warned that India’s drone systems are dangerously reliant on imported components, especially from China. Key areas of concern include autopilot PCBs, unencrypted communication systems, open-source firmware and foreign-sourced GPS/navigation chips. With India’s NavIC (Navigation with Indian Constellation) satellite system still underdeveloped, this dependency poses a major risk if conflict escalates.

A roadmap to drone dominance
To bridge these gaps, Indrabalan outlined a five-point policy framework:

Combat Drone Federation of India: Establish a quasi-governmental body to unify stakeholders and advise the government on technology, regulation and procurement.

Secure military communication bands: Shift drone communications from the citizen band to encrypted VHF military bands.

Operationalise NavIC: Expand and upgrade India’s indigenous satellite navigation system for precise, military-grade positioning.

Redefine 'indigenous content' in defence: Base it on component criticality rather than cost or volume. Components like autopilot systems, communications modules and navigation chips should form 70–80% of the indigenous content definition.

Invest in deep tech: Promote long-gestation, high-risk R&D in drone technology through focused government support.