Death sentence to Sheikh Hasina: Will Bangladesh descent into chaos again?
The political fallout of the court ruling is likely to plunge Bangladesh into uncharted territory, rife with apprehensions of street violence.
The political fallout of the court ruling is likely to plunge Bangladesh into uncharted territory, rife with apprehensions of street violence.
The political fallout of the court ruling is likely to plunge Bangladesh into uncharted territory, rife with apprehensions of street violence.
The ruling by the International Crimes Tribunal in Dhaka, handing down the death penalty to ousted Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her close aide and former Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal in cases relating to alleged crimes against humanity, is certain to deepen the political faultlines further.
The verdict, delivered in absentia as Hasina remains in New Delhi, marks a significant escalation in two main focus areas relating to the cases against her: (1) legal and (2) political campaign by the interim government headed by Chief Adviser Mohammad Yunus to keep Hasina and the Awami League out of the electoral scene.
On the legal front, Hasina retains the right to appeal the conviction in the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, the only legal remedy available to her under the current process, despite multiple warrants issued in her name. Her ability to contest the verdict depends on how and when she chooses to engage with Bangladeshi courts. But Hasina, in her reaction to today’s ICT court’s judgement, has made it amply clear that she has little faith in a fair trial back home under the Yunus government.
While the verdict against Hasina was not at all surprising in the backdrop of her fall from power following the student-led uprising against her government more than a year ago, the political fallouts of the court ruling are likely to plunge Bangladesh into uncharted territory filled with apprehensions of street violence ahead of the proposed national elections in Bangladesh in February next year.
This comes at a time when the Yunus government’s controversial decision was made public on November 13 to hold the national elections on the same day, along with a referendum on a set of key constitutional reforms, including holding an upper house of parliament on the basis of proportional representation of parties in the national elections.
By clubbing the elections and the referendum of ‘yes or no’ vote, Yunus tried to strike a balance between the conflicting demands of the BNP and the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami.
Their differences over holding the referendum notwithstanding, BNP and Jamaat are unlikely to come in the way of holding the elections in February. Jamaat-e-Islami demands that the referendum be held earlier, while BNP does not favour it.
Yunus's decision to hold the referendum on constitutional reform proposals and the parliamentary elections on the same day is aimed at two purposes. Firstly, it is aimed at shutting out Hasina-led Awami League from the election and scheduling both on the same day could help ensure a decent voter turnout. This further dims any prospect of the Awami League’s participation in an inclusive election for which some European Union member countries and international human rights groups have been pressing for.
The most controversial proposal of the Yunus dispensation is the referendum on a set of 30 constitutional changes, which include giving more powers to the country’s President, limiting the Prime Minister's terms in office, strengthening checks and balances, and constitutional recognition of Bangladesh as a multi-ethnic, multi-religious state.
Bangladesh is not new to referendum. But two of the three referendums held in the past were for legitimising the military regimes of Ziaur Rahman and H M Ershad in 1977 and 1985, respectively. This is the first time that one would see a referendum on so many tricky constitutional reforms in one go.
The political atmosphere in Bangladesh has grown uncertain as tensions have intensified throughout 2025. The exclusion of Awami League, the country’s biggest political force, from the coming elections could raise the same questions of credibility which were flagged when BNP had boycotted the national elections in the past.
But what is more worrisome is that the spectre of street violence looms large. Awami League supporters have been clashing with security forces in various parts of the country, including Hasina’s home district, Gopalganj. Hasina’s ancestral home in Dhaka was razed, and thousands of arrests, many believed to be Hasina loyalists, were made under “Operation Devil Hunt.”
Under the 15-year leadership of Sheikh Hasina, Bangladesh’s political system had become highly skewed – the country has essentially become a one-party state that favours groups affiliated with the ruling Awami League. This comes after the party was re-elected to a fourth consecutive term in January 2024 while opposition parties were marginalised.
There is little doubt that under the 15-year Hasina rule, Bangladesh’s political system and democratic institutions had become highly skewed, and the country has essentially turned into a one-party state that favoured individuals and groups affiliated to the Awami League. The biggest challenge for Hasina is to ensure that her party is not squeezed out of Bangladesh's evolving political landscape. This does not necessarily mean a Bangladesh without the two traditional major parties, Awami League and BNP. What it means is that Bangladesh should embrace a rainbow with the peaceful coexistence of all shades of opinions.
(Pallab Bhattacharya is a senior journalist who was posted in Dhaka for several years)