Four days into this asymmetrical conflict, the early aura of decisiveness has given way to strategic ambiguity. When hostilities began, the combined military superiority of the United States and Israel appeared overwhelming, asserting dominance over Tehran’s skies with speed and precision. President Donald Trump framed the escalation as a necessary response, projecting confidence that the confrontation would be contained swiftly. Yet as timelines stretch from days to potentially weeks, the prospect of a quick resolution seems increasingly remote.

The resilience of Iran may have been underestimated. The Islamic Republic’s governing structure has historically demonstrated a high tolerance for sustained confrontation. Unlike Western democracies — where public opinion is deeply sensitive to military casualties — ideologically driven regimes often operate with a markedly different (RTP) risk-taking profile. This asymmetry complicates conventional calculations of deterrence and conflict termination.

Key stakeholders among NATO powers — notably the United Kingdom, France and Germany — have signalled caution about the feasibility of achieving regime change through aerial dominance alone. Air superiority can degrade infrastructure and command structures, but history suggests that political transformation rarely descends from the skies. Should the conflict escalate to include “boots on the ground,” the United States risks entanglement in another protracted campaign reminiscent of Vietnam or Afghanistan.

Israel, too, confronts limits to the efficacy of force. Operations against Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis demonstrate tactical capability but have not extinguished ideological resolve. History reminds us that not every mission can mirror the precision success of Operation ENTABBE’ (Operation Thunderbolt)Sustained bombardment, while militarily potent, may harden adversarial narratives rather than dissolve them.

Meanwhile, the subtler contest unfolds beyond the battlefield. Intelligence agencies — notably the CIA and Israel’s Mossad — are likely engaged in parallel strategic manoeuvres: probing internal fissures, cultivating alternative leadership nodes and assessing whether political transition within Iran is plausible. Speculation ranges from figures connected to the former Shah’s lineage to reformist or nationalist elements within the existing establishment. Yet externally engineered transformation has rarely proven straightforward.

The broader geopolitical context further tempers expectations of decisive change. Pro-Iran powers such as Russia and China have largely positioned themselves as vocal but non-kinetic supporters. Moscow remains preoccupied with the Ukraine war, while Beijing traditionally avoids direct military entanglements beyond its core interests. Their backing, therefore, appears calibrated to diplomatic signalling rather than battlefield intervention.

Domestically within the United States, the political stakes are considerable. President Trump has attributed Iran’s regional ascent to policies under former President Barack Houssain Obama. Yet American public opinion remains wary of prolonged conflicts and rising casualties. A drawn-out engagement could deepen partisan divides and reshape electoral calculations for years to come.

As the conflict evolves, one conclusion appears clear: overwhelming force can initiate confrontation, but shaping its political endgame demands patience, legitimacy and a sober understanding of the adversary’s will. In West Asia, resilience — not merely firepower — often determines history’s direction.
(The author has made significant contributions to the Indian Army’s engineering development during the Bangladesh Liberation War and the Kargil War.)