All in gang rape liable if one commits act under common intention: SC

New Delhi: The Supreme Court upheld the convictions of individuals found guilty of gang rape, rejecting their argument that they could not be held liable as they had not personally committed the act of penetration.

The apex court clarified that under Explanation 1 to Section 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code, if a penetrative act is carried out by even one person, all others sharing a common intention can also be held liable for gang rape.

Relying on the precedent set in the case of Ashok Kumar vs State of Haryana (2003) 2 SCC 143, the bench comprising Justices Sanjay Karol and KV Viswanathan said, “It is very clear that in a case of gang rape under Section 376(2)(g), an act by one is enough to render all in the gang for punishment as long as they have acted in furtherance of the common intention. Further, common intention is implicit in the charge of Section 376(2)(g) itself, and all that is needed is evidence to show the existence of common intention.”

In Ashok Kumar's case, the top court clarified that “if rape had been committed by even one, all the accused will be guilty irrespective of the fact that she had been raped by one or more of them and it is not necessary for the prosecution to adduce evidence of a completed act of rape by each one of the accused.”

It was the case where the appellants were charged for their active participation in abduction and confinement of the prosecutrix leading to her rape. They pleaded that offence of gang rape was not committed by them as they didn't commit any penetrative act.

Rejecting their argument, the trial court followed by the High Court convicted them for gang rape. Challenging their conviction, they approached the Supreme Court.

Affirming the impugned findings, the judgment authored by Justice Viswanathan observed, “In this case, as is clear from the sequence of events, the abduction of the victim, her wrongful confinement, her testimony about being subjected to sexual assault points to the fact that the ingredients of Section 376(2)(g) are squarely attracted and the appellant herein along with Jalandhar Kol (main accused) acted in concert and with a common intention to sexually assault the prosecutrix 'R'.”
(With LiveLaw inputs)